Libel and Slander

Libel and Slander
Date: 21 Oct, 2021| Author: Fred Streiman

It is more often than not that ugly allegations of misconduct are thrown between divorcing parties. Courts are used to these mudslinging matches which are generally given little weight unless particularly on point. Also, the usual place to launch such verbal attacks is within the four corners of the lawsuit. While a judge may penalize the more morally outrageous and unsubstantiated allegations so long as they are within the four corners of the lawsuit they are privileged and not capable of being the foundation of a libel and slander action.

However, when one steps outside the courtroom and into the minefield of social media, by repeating those allegations the dart thrower may be subject of a civil lawsuit of defamation.

Also complicating the court’s job are the provisions of Section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, commonly referred to as anti-SLAPP provisions, which is an acronym that stands for strategic lawsuit against public participation. That section of the Act allows the defendant in a defamation lawsuit to have it dismissed on the basis that it will unduly eliminate or limit legitimate criticism about a matter of public interest. The concept is to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest and to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest.

In the recent June 11, 2021 decision of Justice Gomery in Smith v. Nagy, a divorce had descended into some very nasty and salacious allegations between the parties.

Husband and wife before they separated letter led a very sexual relationship, including performing in adult films and the production of avant-garde art work. After the separation, the wife posted via Facebook allegations that the husband had caused her to suffer post-traumatic stress disorder and that he had subjected her to sexual, psychological and emotional abuse. The post on Facebook was widely distributed and the husband outside of the family law lawsuit, countered by commencing a civil action for defamation. The wife moved to dismiss the husband’s civil lawsuit relying on both the SLAPP provisions and further claimed that her statements were true and constituted fair comment or are protected by a qualified privilege. Such a civil suit may very well be tried together with the divorce action. Justice Gomery dismissed the wife’s motion and permitted the defamation action to continue. The issues at point the court felt were particularly important. There appeared to be little doubt from reading the evidence provided by the husband in the motion that he had truly suffered significant financial and personal loss as a result of the wife’s Facebook posting.

Words of warning, 1. Stay within the court playground and 2. Once again social media is a two-edged sword and from this writer’s perspective, the benefit of its entire existence has yet to be established.

Put on Notice: Only 60 Days to Report Slip and Falls

dale
Date: 20 Aug, 2021| Author: Fred Streiman

By: Rebecca Rosenberg

In December 2020, Bill 118, the Occupiers’ Liability Amendment Act, became law in Ontario. Now, someone who experiences a slip-and-fall such as on snow or ice on another’s property must provide the other party with written notice within 60 days. The previous limitation period for reporting these types of accidents was two years.

On the one hand, this is a win for contractors and insurance companies who often pay premium rates to protect against accidents during Canada’s cruel winters.

From their perspective, Bill 118 works to prevent people from ‘sleeping on their rights. Many businesses have complained that lawyers will file a claim just weeks before the two-year deadline in the hopes that the defendant won’t have time to adequately prepare. The idea behind the law is likely to filter out fraudulent slip-and-fall lawsuits. The 60-day limit also gives defendants enough notice to quickly respond to claims with the appropriate evidence rather than having to retroactively respond to an issue two years after the fact.

On the other hand, the new limitation could impact people’s right to sue. The claimant might have experienced a severe injury impacting their ability to take the necessary steps for filing a lawsuit. As well, many individuals may face significant difficulties accessing legal resources or representation. It takes time not only to find legal aid, but also to collect the relevant information to bring forth a claim, such as the property owner or corporation’s contact information. When suing a municipality, for instance, specific information might be required regarding your medical treatment and history.

However, the legislation does provide an exception under s.6.1(6) for circumstances where the claimant had a “reasonable excuse” for not giving proper notice. What is reasonable or not would be decided on by the judge on the case.

If you or someone you know has a possible personal injury case because of a slip and/or fall, keep in mind the 60-day limit. Unfortunately, not all lawyers in Ontario or the public in general are aware of the new limitation period. For all accident-related cases, our firm recommends Smitiuch Injury Law whose lawyers can help guide you through the complicated and often painful process of filing a slip and fall lawsuit.

SCJ should be in Small Claims Court

Date: 21 Jul, 2021| Author: Fred Streiman


Civil Litigation
Our former partner, the Honourable Mr. Justice Kurz strikes again
Suing in Superior Court when you should be in Small Claims Court is an abuse of process

Our former and greatly missed partner, the Honourable Mr. Justice Marvin Kurz of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice continues to make important decisions, which have ramifications for the entire Province of Ontario.

In his July 8, 2021 decision, Canaceede Credit LP v. Schulz, he stopped a common strategy used by collection firms.

Large institutions such as banks rather than dealing with the collection of small debts would simply sell them for pennies on the dollar to another company.  In this case, Canaceede bought debts owed to various banks.  The amounts involved were all far below the $35,000.00 limit of Small Claims Court.  Canaccede, even though it was located in London, Ontario, had a strategy whereby it would commence an action in Milton in the Superior Court of Justice.   Superior Court as one can imagine has far more complicated rules, amongst them, generally not permitting a party to be represented by a paralegal in contrast to Small Claims Court.  Small Claims Court is also strongly tilted in favour of parties litigating on their own behalf in an effort to make justice more accessible.

Canaceede, taking advantage of the fact that what they were doing was not prohibited would ignore the Small Claims Court alternative and simply sue everyone in Superior Court out of Milton.  One can assume that they chose Milton as they felt it was a jurisdiction in which the backlogs were less than others.  It mattered not to Canaceede where the defendant lived (an option not granted in Small Claims Court) all of their defendants were sued in Milton.

Canaceede applied for the court’s permission for substituted service.  A plaintiff may ask the court for permission to serve a defendant by an alternate means when they cannot easily be found or served.   Unfortunately for Canaceede, three of such requests all found their way to Justice Kurz’s desk simultaneously.

Justice Kurz in a lengthy decision decided that this process of suing in Superior Court for matters clearly within the jurisdiction of Small Claims Court was an abuse of process.  The strong supposition was that this course of action was being undertaken to make it difficult for a defendant to fight the claim.

Canaceede indicated that what they did was extremely common throughout the credit collection industry.

Justice Kurz in a detailed and lengthy fashion wagged his finger no no no.  Justice Kurz reiterated that the Superior Court has inherent  jurisdiction to manage its own process unless there was a statutory reason for them not to do so.

Justice Kurz ordered that all three lawsuits be transferred to the appropriate Small Claims Court jurisdiction where the defendants lived.

From Canaceede’s perspective, they are faced with an interesting dilemma and one will have to see how this develops.  If they live with this decision, it is simply made at a trial judge level.  It is persuasive but not binding.  If they appeal and win, then they will have clearly re-established the existing strategy that they have been using successfully.  However, if they appeal and lose, then there will an appellant decision which indeed will be binding upon trial judges and no doubt will come to the wide spread attention of court clerks and judges across the Province and will put an end to this practice.

As is often the case, judges lead the way in making decisions that really should have been made by the legislature.  This decision alone may very well cause a change in the rules that will bring an end to this collection strategy.  Canaceede admitted that it had presently before the court in Milton 109 similar cases.

An important decision for defendants of modest means across the Province and the collection industry as a whole.

REMOVAL OF THE JUDGE RECUSAL MOTION- REASONABLE APPREHENSION BIAS

Date: 14 Jan, 2020| Author: Fred Streiman

On rare occasions, one can remove the presiding judge if one can show that the judge is displaying bias in the hearing before them or for some other reason is not objective. One should look at the decision of Justice Paull of the Ontario Court of Justice in CAS Oxford v. EMT, a 2019 decision. In that case, Justice Paull reviewed all of the law in this area, which begins with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v. S, a 1997 decision and the Committee for Justice of Liberty v. Canada, a 1976 Supreme Court of Canada decision. The courts had held “the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one held by reasonable and right minded persons applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. The test is what would an informed person viewing the matter realistically and practicality…. and having thought the matter through conclude. The presence or absence of an apprehension of bias is evaluated through the eyes of a reasonable, informed practical and realistic person.

The Ontario Court of Appeal also weighed in Bailey vs. Barbour in 2012. It requires a high threshold of evidence when a party seeks a recusal i.e. the disqualification of a judge. Allegations of judicial bias will have to overcome a strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

Rarely attempted and even more rarely accomplished.

Internet Defamation

Date: 21 Mar, 2018| Author: Fred Streiman

A case recently crossed our desks that I simply had to comment on. The Ontario Court of Appeal in the recent case of Rutman v. Rabinowitz set a very high watermark by awarding $700,000.00 in damages for Internet Defamation. The Defendants’ were found to have mounted a lengthy defamatory internet campaign against the plaintiff. Despite the fact that the plaintiff was not able to prove any specific injury to his reputation in the community, the court still hit the defendants on the head with one of the largest defamation awards ever granted.

The court felt that the very nature of internet defamation in which information is widely, instantly and permanently spread needed to attract the court’s heavy handed condemnation.

The case was also interesting in that one of the defendants did not actually partake in the defamation but was aware of it and did nothing to stop and indeed facilitated the process. The court held that one does not have to directly participate in making the defamatory statements to be found to be an equally liable party.

Interesting stuff as the internet, which has already revolutionized all of our lives is magnifying a very ancient area of law and the damages awarded under it.

The Client’s Best Interest: A Lawyer’s Obligation to their Client

Date: 04 Jul, 2014| Author: Fred Streiman

Thumbnail-LogoLawyers have an obligation to provide advice that is in the best interests of their client. In providing advice, a lawyer must bring reasonable care, skill and knowledge to the performance of the professional services they undertake. Their conduct must meet the standard of care of a reasonable lawyer viewed in light of the time constraints, the nature of the client’s instructions and the client’s experience and sophistication. The standard is fairly high and lawyers, along with the various law societies across Canada, strive to maintain that. However, a lawyer can only advise their client on their options, they cannot force them to do anything. Our job is to present you with options, advise you about the strengths and weakness of each option, and then to follow through on your instructions.

Your lawyer is not an insurance police if you ignore their advice. This reality is highlighted by the recent Superior Court of Justice case of Marcus v Cochrane[i].  In that case, the lawyer, Ms. Cochrane, was acting for Ms. Marcus during her divorce. Ms. Marcus had already negotiated a separation agreement with her husband and she was seeking independent legal advice with Ms. Cochrane before finalizing the agreement. Ms. Cochrane advised Ms. Marcus that it was not in her best interest to agree to a final separation agreement without reviewing financial disclosure from her husband. Ms. Cochrane advised her client that it would be best to sign a partial agreement. Nevertheless, Ms. Marcus wanted to sign the final separation agreement, despite her lawyer’s advise against that.  Some time later, Ms. Marcus decided that the final agreement was not actually fair. She tried to sue her former lawyer for failing to stop her from agreeing to the final separation agreement. The court found that it was Ms. Marcus who chose not to follow the advice of her lawyer, Ms. Cochrane.  A lawyer can only advise about the risks and benefits involved with all the options available to their client. They cannot force the client to pursue the course of action they feel is best. Consequently, Ms. Marcus lost the claim against her former lawyer for failing to convince her to only sign a partial separation agreement.

Furthermore, Ms. Marcus had to pay a full indemnity costs award to her former lawyer. This is a rare order from the court only done when there are clear grounds to force one party to cover the other party’s entire legal costs. In this case, the court found that Ms. Marcus knew or ought to have known that her claim against her lawyer could not succeed. The evidence was overwhelmingly against her, yet she persisted in taking her matter to trial. Therefore, she is responsible for all of Ms. Cochrane’s costs associated with this claim. This is a warning to individuals who have second thoughts and want to blame their lawyer for their bad decisions.

The role of a lawyer is to provide their client with the best possible advice and to explain the risks and advantages associated with each and every available course of action. At Dale Streiman Law LLP, we rely upon the considerable expertise that our lawyers have gained over decades of practicing family law. Our job is to know and advise you on the best possible course of action given your specific case. Our role is not to force you into a courtroom or to settle for less than you deserve. We tailor our advice to your unique needs with special consideration of the financial, emotion and time costs that are present in many family law proceedings. If you’re in the midst of a divorce or a custody battle and require expert legal advice, please visit our website at www.dsklaw.com or book an appointment with one of our lawyers.


[i] Marcus v Cochrane, 2012 ONSC 146 available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc146/2012onsc146.html for the initial lawsuit and 2012 ONSC 2331 available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc2331/2012onsc2331.html for the full indemnity cost award

ASSUMPTION OF RISK-IS THE THRILL REALLY WORTH IT?

Date: 07 Mar, 2014| Author: Fred Streiman

It was like having the life having sucked out of you. It’s just sliding down a cable. Maybe without a tour group, it’d be kind of fun. Maybe.

Stan, South Park, TV: South Park 16.6 I Should Have Never Gone Zip lining

When Deanna Loychuk and Danielle Westgeest booked their zip line adventure at Cougar Mountain in Whistler, British Columbia, they were eagerly looking forward to their exhilarating cable line expedition through the forest. They made a reservation and followed through, ready to embark on their adventure. They were asked by Cougar Mountain to sign a release and signed it without thinking twice.

We have all done that at one point in time, foolishly, thinking we are invincible and there would be no need to worry about lawsuits and court actions when you could be the next Evel Knievel. They saw the usual title and words release of liability, waiver of claims please read carefully and nonetheless submitted the form before their excursion. They were not forced to go zip lining. No one from Cougar Mountain coerced them to engage in this thrill seeking behaviour.

The ride began and the two women collided as a result of miscommunication between the guides in control of the rides resulting in injuries to both women. Together they sued Cougar Mountain but lost at trial (2011 BCSC 193, 81 C.C.L.T. (3d) 89 and the decision was upheld at the British Columbia Court of Appeal (2012 BCCA 122 (CanLii))

Cougar Mountain admitted the accident was caused by the negligence of their staff but argued that the women had waived their cause of action by signing a valid release. The two Plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the release was unenforceable as it was not explained to them, unconscionable, was invalid under the BC Consumer Protection Act due to the deceptive acts of Cougar Mountain and invalid because there was no consideration. The trial judge rejected these arguments and dismissed the action.

Upon appeal, the court found that it was not unconscionable for an operator of a facility at which participants engage in inherently risky recreational activities to require that person to sign a release barring future claims citing the fact that such participation is voluntary, not mandatory.

The Judge held that the release was not unconscionable or deceptive and that the consideration for signing the release was the ability to participate in the activity, whether or not they read or understood the true meaning of the release they were giving.

Although a British Columbia case, the effects of this decision are far reaching and likely to be adopted in Ontario in similar circumstances.

What does this mean for the everyday thrill seeker? It means that one who engages in objectively dangerous activities and signs a release gives up their right to sue if something goes wrong or damage occurs, even if the fault lays with another party.

In other words, when you sign a release, you are contracting out of negligence claims, thereby giving up your common law rights without even perhaps realizing this is the case. It is only in significant circumstances will a release be set aside to restore a cause of action.

The message seems to be very clear if you participate in a risky activity, sign a waiver which has clear terms, is legible and understandable you will have no rights against a party and assume the risks yourself if an injury or damage ensues.

This case should cause people to think twice about whether or not the activity they want to engage in such as zip lining, horseback riding, sky diving or bungee jumping is really worth the risk in the long run.

What is The Common Law and how is that different from other parts of the world

Date: 06 Mar, 2014| Author: Fred Streiman

All of Canada, (with the exception of Quebec, which maintains a civil law system) is a common law jurisdiction. The common law is a legacy of the British empire. Spread across the world all of those formerly pink coloured former members of the British empire, continue to maintain a common law system of justice. The United States, with the exception of Louisiana is a common law jurisdiction.

The main feature of a common law judicial system is that it is a body of law at least partially derived from judge made decisions rather than solely from statutes or constitutions.In common law jurisdictions, it is not unusual to see contracts, wills, and other agreements from widely separated parts of the world bear remarkable similarities. I have seen wills drafted in India, South Africa, parts of the Caribbean and all over the United States, bear many resemblances to a Will drafted in Ontario, despite the fact that the laws of wills and estates are provincially distinct.

One of the primary characteristics of the common law is that statutes and laws are passed by the legislature, however, they are relatively general in their provision. It is for judges to interpret these laws to expand upon them and at times, to create them.The common law has long historical roots. Torts, which are a civil action for a wrong, are not a closed set. The courts from time to time create brand new areas of civil wrong which can be sued upon. The most recent in Ontario in 2012 was the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, also commonly known as the invasion of privacy.

Civil law, primarily a derivative of the Napoleonic code, attempts to avoid the lack of clarity and predictability of the common law. The civil law attempts to produce a code which is all encompassing and specific. It is an attempt to create a detailed code in which the answer is available by reading that code rather than seeking a judge’s interpretation.The common law conversely is rooted in judicial history. Previous judge’s decisions are interpreted and followed. The principle of the case is absorbed into the common law. A prime example of common law is that of negligence and the standards of conduct by which persons, companies and indeed even governments are to conduct themselves. When ones conduct crosses the civil line of appropriate and safe behavior and acts in a negligent fashion, this creates a tort which in turn is the basis for a civil law suit. Almost all of these rules are judge made. They remain until trumped by a higher court or the legislature passes a specific law to amend it. An example is the Ontario Occupier’s Liability Act in which the government clarified various rules and set standards. In turn, the Occupier’s Liability Act, contains many general provisions. Those general provisions are interpreted by judges and create new judge made laws which are followed and evolve.

This long winded explanation of the differences between common law and civil law, while legally highly entertaining, is to a degree, one of the reasons why lawyers often cannot give absolute predictions as to how a case will be decided at a particular point in time. The decisions are driven by both the facts and the court’s interpretation of those facts and the law. The law is made both by the Government and Judges. Cases are recorded and are now far more readily accessible in various computer databases. I can assure you that there are few exercises more frustrating then attempting to find an earlier decided case, which contains the very same fact situation as the one presented by your client. One of the most troubling of all such circumstances is when a set of facts that the lawyer is absolutely certain is as common as hot dogs at a baseball game, has never had a recorded case directly on point. It is the lawyer’s task and a reflection of their ability to draw similarities from non similar cases and to use their powers of persuasion to convince a court as to why their client should be successful.

THE NEW TORT OF INVASION FOR PRIVACY

Date: 06 Mar, 2014| Author: Fred Streiman

The Ontario Court of Appeal in 2012 in the case of Jones v Tsige, has created a new cause of action or a basis for suing someone. The exotic title of this is called intrusion upon seclusion. The technical components of this new basis for suing someone civilly is:

[list type=”decimal”]

  • An intentional or reckless conduct on the part of the Defendant.
  • An invasion of the Plaintiffs private affairs without lawful justification, and
  • An invasion that a reasonable person would regard as highly offensive and that causes the Plaintiff distress, humiliation or anguish.

[/list]

While this case is of great interest to experts in privacy law, it potentially has large ramifications for family law.The facts in Jones v. Tsige are based in a family law environment. Jones, was a customer at the Bank of Montreal. Ms. Tsige, worked at the Bank of Montreal and had a dispute with her common law spouse who had earlier been married to the Plaintiff, Ms. Jones. Tsige, rather than learning from her common law spouse how much support he was paying, without authorization, accessed Ms. Jones banking records. The bank became involved, and disciplined Ms. Tsige who apologized.

This fact situation has lead to the birth of a new basis upon which to sue someone, namely an intrusion upon seclusion, also known as the new tort for invasion of privacy.It is extremely common in family law circumstances, for a spouse to go rooting around in the private papers of the other, when a marriage comes crashing to an end. A relationship based upon absolute trust, quickly changes into one of absolute distrust and disbelief. Emails are intercepted, private records and letters are opened, all in an effort to discover evidence or to gain a factual upper hand. Lawyers must be careful in what they advise their clients as to what they can do and whether or not their advice may leave their clients or relatives open to an additional law suit for damages arising from an intrusion upon the other spouses seclusion. It will be interesting to see how this area of law evolves.

The Court of Appeal set some limits to ensure we realize that we are not in Kansas or the wild west of the other 49 United States. The court set an upper range of damages at $20,000.00 and in the Jones v Tsige case, it awarded damages of $10,000.00 and no costs. It would be prudent for lawyers, in the appropriate circumstances to add additional grounds of damages of intrusion upon seclusion. Another example of that is for intentional infliction of mental distress or assaults at the hands of the other spouse. For more information, please fee free to contact the family law group at Dale, Streiman Law LLP.

WRONGFUL DISMISSAL EVEN IF FIRED, YOU HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO LOOK FOR A JOB DUTY TO MITIGATE

Date: 06 Mar, 2014| Author: Fred Streiman

The right of an employee to sue an employer who has wrongfully fired or terminated them, is really a subset of contract law.Within that area of contract law is the common issue of mitigation of damages.

Simply put, just because you have suffered a loss because another party has broken their contract with you, you must still make efforts to attempt to reduce those losses. Commonly referred to as mitigation of damages, the simplest example of that in wrongful dismissal is a fired employee must make an effort to find another job.Even if one is terminated unfairly, if you find a replacement job that earns you the same salary or greater, may potentially have no damages and no cause of action whatsoever. This is a gross oversimplification that ignores complicating factors such as damages under the human rights code and properly calculating the damages that one has suffered.

To repeat, if you are wrongfully fired, you need to make a genuine effort to find a replacement job and must be able to prove it.In some cases, the entire issue of what will occur if your employer terminates you is governed by an employment contract. Most employment contracts set out specifically what the fired employee will receive if they are fired without justification.In the recent and interesting 2012 Ontario Court of Appeal decision of Bowes v. Goss Power Products Ltd., the court strictly upheld the employment contract despite the fact that the employee’s damages were virtually nothing.

In that case, the parties had signed an employment contract requiring the employee would receive six months salary if he was terminated without justification. The contract said nothing about the obligation of the employee to mitigate his damages. The employee found a similar paying job within two weeks and the employer felt that there was accordingly no need to pay anything other than the statutory minimum required under the Employment Standards Act (in this case three weeks pay).

While the employer was initially successful at trial, the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed that decision. The Court of Appeal held that a contract was a contract. If the employer wanted that normal contractual obligation of duty to mitigate to be within it, it should have been inserted.This is not the law in the usual case of an employee who is terminated when there is no contract of employment whatsoever. That obligation to find another job and reduce your damages still exists.

One of the civil litigation lawyers at Dale Streiman Law LLP would be pleased to discuss your employment situation.One should note that employees who are governed by a union contract are subject to an entirely different set of rules which are almost exclusively set out in that union contract.

By: Fred Streiman
Fred-Streiman